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across the Empire. But he does not delve into the possible implications of this fact. So what 
happened to Roman law in Wales after the fi rst half of the fi fth century? The question cannot, 
I suspect, be answered, but a critical exploration of the issue would have been welcome. (For a 
recent study of the Reichsrecht/Volksrecht debate, see Kaius Tuori’s chapter in John Cairns and 
Paul du Plessis (eds), Beyond Dogmatics: Law and Society in the Roman World (2007).)
Professor Watkin continues the chronological account down to the present day. This book is 
a history not of “Welsh law” but of the law in Wales. Professor Watkin is not trying to invent a 
nationalist myth. His work is objective and scholarly, and even if it may appear a slightly quirky 
enterprise, it was worth doing. Though it may be true that one cannot really speak of Welsh law 
or of a Welsh legal system, that may be changing, and the very fact that a book like this now 
appears may say something about the principality’s juridical future: the categories of histori-
ography are themselves a part of the cultural, political and sociological fl ow of human affairs.
George L Gretton
University of Edinburgh
EdinLR Vol 11 pp 461-462 
Graham Virgo, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION
Oxford: Oxford University Press (www.oup.com), 2nd edn, 2006. lxi + 785 pp.
ISBN 9780199298501. £80.
The second edition of Graham Virgo’s treatment of the English law of restitution provides, in 
the tradition of the fi rst, suffi cient by way of theoretical grounding as well as of the treatment 
of practical issues to interest both academic and practitioner. Virgo’s explanation of the law is 
always relevant, and his analysis of his subject matter is aided by sensible subdivisions. He is 
careful to explain the essential components of different types of restitutionary claim, leaving the 
reader in no doubt as to what is required by the courts. There is an extensive bibliography, and 
excellent references to other academic works and theory in the footnotes, as well as to a range 
of Commonwealth precedent. All of this makes for a commendable achievement.
The continued utility of works on a remedial subject such as restitution, as opposed to one 
on unjust enrichment, might be questioned by some. Virgo’s  justifi cation is twofold. First, “by 
grouping cases together which are concerned with the same legal issues, common principles 
can be identifi ed which assist in the better understanding and prediction of the law”. Second, 
restitution “forces us to make connections which might otherwise be ignored.” Such justifi ca-
tions may not convince everyone. It is doubtful, for instance, whether it is helpful to call restitu-
tion either an “independent body of law” or a “legal category”, as Virgo does. On the contrary, 
as a remedy, restitution is entirely dependent upon the causes of action which give rise to it. 
Moreover, there is a danger that some of the “connections which might otherwise be ignored” 
are connections which may themselves ignore, or fail properly to take account of, differences 
stemming from the different causes of action which give rise to the single remedy. This is not 
to say that there is no value in works treating of remedies, but it ought to be recognised (rather 
than fl atly contradicted) that such works concern dependent legal subjects. 
As for unjust enrichment itself, Virgo explains (at 9) that “the enrichment must have been 
received in circumstances of injustice, meaning that the claim falls within one of the recogn-
ised grounds of restitution”. For Virgo, an enrichment can only be unjust in English law if the 
circumstances fi t one of the individual grounds for restitution, in other words if the specifi c 
formula for restitution is recognised by the law. This feature of English law marks its system out, 
in Virgo’s mind, as one where unjust enrichment plays a formulaic rather than a normative role, 
a description which identifi es Virgo as a supporter of the casuistic, almost Pharisaic, approach 
to the development of English law: what matters is reciting the right legal wording or formula, 
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rather than uniting the law under any overarching, principled superstructure. It is unsurpris-
ing therefore to fi nd that Virgo is not a supporter of the sine causa approach to enrichment 
supported by Peter Birks in his remarkable volte-face shortly before his death. 
While Birks’s change of heart was certainly controversial, Virgo’s attack on the sine causa 
approach to enrichment lacks persuasiveness. Setting out fi ve counter-arguments (at 128-130), 
he fi rst asserts that the English authorities do not compel us to adopt a Birksian view. True, but 
nor did they compel English law to accept a body of law called restitution at all. 
Second, Virgo argues that in sine causa systems the defendant is forced to justify his reten-
tion of a benefi t. In fact, this is not a wholly accurate description of all Civilian or even mixed 
systems which adopt a sine causa approach to enrichment law. Virgo is describing an “unjustifi ed 
unless” approach to enrichment, one under which a defendant must justify why it should retain 
an enrichment, yet he omits to mention the alternative “unjustifi ed if” approach under which 
the claimant must make out grounds for restoration. A sine causa system is quite able to place 
the burden on the claimant, thereby adopting an “unjustifi ed if” approach, while yet recognising 
that the general criterion for describing an enrichment as “unjustifi ed” is whether its retention 
lacks any legal basis. This is arguably so for Scotland, as I have argued elsewhere (“Unjustifi ed 
enrichment in Scots law twenty years on: where now?” 2006 Restitution Law Review 1). 
Third, Virgo asserts that a sine causa approach would undermine the certainty of receipt of 
benefi ts. As with the previous point, this need not be so in systems adopting an “unjustifi ed if” 
approach. 
Fourth, adopting a sine causa approach would, Virgo says, oversimplify English law. That 
need not be the case; systems operating a sine causa approach can still have a highly developed 
taxonomy, as German Law demonstrates. 
Last, a sine causa approach would cause unnecessary confusion and uncertainty. Need that 
be so? Surely adding a unifying principle would rather make more sense out of the existing 
confused and piecemeal approach of English law. Niall Whitty and Hector MacQueen have 
demonstrated that this may be so for Scottish law in their respective re-workings of the Scot-
tish authorities within a sine causa framework: see MacQueen, Unjustifi ed Enrichment (2004); 
Whitty, “Rationality, nationality and the taxonomy of unjustifi ed enrichment”, in D Johnston and 
R Zimmermann (eds), Unjustifi ed Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002).
These remarks are not intended to suggest that this is not an impressive, scholarly and well-
written work, for it is. If one accepts Virgo’s premise that English restitution law continues to be 
a valuable independent body of law, that it should continue to develop in a piecemeal fashion, 
and that an overarching principle of unjustifi ed enrichment should neither found a cause of 
action in itself nor depend for its unjustifi ed element upon a concept of “absence of basis”, then 
one will fi nd little to criticise in this work. 
Martin Hogg
University of Edinburgh
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Lilian Edwards and Anne Griffi ths, FAMILY LAW
Edinburgh: W Green and Son Ltd (www.wgreen.co.uk), 2nd edn, 2006. 573 pp. 
ISBN 0 4140 1395 6. £ 36.
Since the fi rst edition was published in 1996, there has been a great deal of change in this area 
of the law. With the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Civil Partnership Act 
2004 and the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, to name but a few, this edition had a lot to catch 
up on. It does so in an accurate and engaging manner. Coverage includes parental rights and 
responsibilities, children in care, the hearings system, marriage and civil partnership, including 
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